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The Political Question Revisited: War
Powers and the "Zone of Twilight"*
By ABNER J. MnIvA**
I
Let me begin by sketching a perhaps familiar picture of a
President's use of war powers. The international situation is
tense, and the world economy is shaky In a distant region where
militarism has long been brewing, a country is mesmerized by a
charismatic leader who seized power preaching greatness through
war. This country is already at war with neighbors, but it now
seems on the verge of attacking an important American trading
partner and perhaps eventually America itself. The dilemma for
the United States is clear: to do nothing means that America's
strategic interests will suffer, but to enter the hostilities risks
escalating them considerably. On the home front, Americans are
in an isolatiomst mood. They are still weary from the nation's
last war and reluctant to commit to another military encounter
overseas. Congress, echoing this national sentiment, is cautious.
Yet the President feels that America's strategic interests require
it to come to the assistance of the imperiled nation. Without the
approval of Congress, the President simply begins to offer aid.
He begins by reflagging some much-needed destroyer ships, which
he hopes will keep the enemy at bay The national debate is
furious. Many Americans support the President's actions as
necessary to protect American strategic interests. Others warn
that the nation is being dragged into war. Congressmen complain
bitterly that they were not consulted.
* The Roy and Virgima Ray Lecture, University of Kentucky College of Law,
November 5, 1987.
** Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Washington,
D.C. The numbered footnotes contain only citations to cases and other authorities.
Nothing of substance can be found in the footnotes. See Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes,
56 U. CoLo. L. REv 647 (1985).
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Any similarities to current events in the Persian Gulf not-
withstanding, the setting is 1941, the President is Roosevelt, and
the issue is Roosevelt's transfer of old Umted States naval de-
stroyers to help England ward off the Third Reich. Roosevelt
acted not only without congressional consent, but in the face of
a series of Neutrality Acts that expressed Congress's will that
America not transport arms or become involved in the growing
hostilities. As the situation in Europe worsened, of course, Con-
gress soon came around to the President's viewpoint and passed
the Lend-Lease Act, which authorized the sort of transfers of
armaments that Roosevelt had begun on his own. Roosevelt's
actions in 1941 raised for many people-as similar events do
today-the question of how far the President's war powers
extend in the absence of congressional authorization.
Disputes like the one between Roosevelt and the Congress
have raged since the earliest days of our republic. History teaches
us that Congress has three choices in the face of a presidential
exercise of war powers. First, Congress can simply decide that
the President has not exceeded his authority as commander-m-
chief and do nothing. Second, Congress can enact some form
of limitation on the President's activities. If Congress chooses
this option, its arsenal is wide: Congress may take any measure
from registering mild disapproval to cutting off funding entirely
for particular military ventures. Finally, a third option-the use
of which has proliferated since the Vietnam War-is that Con-
gress can decline to act itself but turn to the judicial branch for
a ruling that the President has exceeded his constitutional pow-
ers.
This third option is my topic today As a federal judge, I
come here to recommend that we not make the courts the
arbiters of these disputes. I believe that questions of military
deployment are best settled by the interplay of the political
branches. Courts have jurisprudential doctrines available-no-
tably the political question doctrine and the standing require-
ment-to avoid taking on such cases when they want to avoid
them. I will suggest that courts should step carefully when they
walk through what Justice Jackson has called the "zone of
twilight"-that area in which the President's authority is un-
clear, and Congress has not indicated whether or not it approves
of the President's actions. I believe that when courts are con-
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fronted with litigation over the extent of the President's war
power, they should stay out of the dispute unless it has been
shown that the dispute is one that the political branches cannot
resolve on their own.
II
The rationale for keeping the courts out of the process of
determining the nation's military actions begins, as it must, with
the text of the Constitution. The war power occupies a unique
netherworld in the constitutional scheme. Of all the major pow-
ers enumerated in the Constitution, it is perhaps the least clearly
allocated: unlike the other specifically enumerated powers, it is
neither granted exclusively to one branch, nor neatly divided
between two.
The Founders were perfectly capable of making clear and
exclusive allocations of power to a single branch of government
when they so desired. Article I vests in Congress alone the
"Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises."'
Article II states that "Itihe executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America. ' 2 Article III places
the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." ' 3 Each of these grants of power is made simply and
unconditionally At the other extreme, the Constitution rigidly
divides other powers between branches. The power to make
treaties, for example, is divided between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches with procedural clarity- article II accords the
President the power to make treaties "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate" and "provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur. ' 4 The appointment of judges and am-
bassadors is similarly divided between the legislative and the
executive branches.5
The allocation of the war power fits neither of these two
models. Like the power to make treaties, the Constitution vests
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
2 Id. at art. II, § 1.
3 Id. at art. III, § 1.




the war power in both the legislative and executive branches.
Like the exclusive allocations of power, however, it vests the
war power in seemingly absolute terms. The President is made
the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States," 6 and Congress is given the power "[t]o declare War"
and to "provide for the common Defense. ' 7 Unlike in the case
of treaties, no neat' procedure is established for how the two
branches are to work in concert on the question of war powers.
The Founders did not place the war powers in this tenuous
position by accident. Rather, the manner in which it is allocated
shows every sign of a careful balancing of competing concerns.
The reasons that the Founders wanted to separate powers are
discussed at length in The Federalist Papers. As Madison ex-
plained in Federalist 47, the Constitution divides powers among
branches because "[tihe accumulation of all powers m the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny "s The. Founders certainly were
not blind to the potential for tyranny inherent in the war power.
James Wilson, second only to Madison in his role as a drafter
of the Constitution, told the Constitutional Convention that
Congress was given the power to declare war to ensure that the
''system will not hurry us into war" and to ensure that no
"single man [can] involve us in such distress." 9
Yet the Founders also were not blind to the umque counter-
vailing rationale for not dividing the war power rigidly and for
not tying the President's hands excessively They were well aware
that war cannot be fought by committee and that the common
defense may require an uncommon degree of presidential au-
thority As Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, "[o]f all the cares
or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly
demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power
by a single hand."10 In examining the scope of the President's
6 Id. at art. II, § 2.
Id. at art. I, § 8.
" TEE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (New Am. Libr. ed. 1961) (Mclean
ed. 1788).
9 2 Tim DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUION 583
(M. Jensen ed. 1976).
10 Tim FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 8, at 447 (A. Hamilton).
[VOL. 76
WAR POWERS
authority to make war, advocates of a broad presidential war
power have made much of the fact that the Founders-on a
motion by James Madison and Elbridge Gerry-changed the
constitutional allocation to Congress from the power to "make"
war to the power to "declare" war, presumably endorsing a
broader presidential role and a narrower role for Congress."
Justice Jackson exaggerated only a little when he cautioned
that in interpreting the respective war powers of Congress and
the President, "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would
have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be
divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.' 2 Nevertheless, if we
can divine little from the text of the Constitution, I tink we
can divine this: by dividing the war power unclearly between
Congress and the executive, the Constitution leaves the precise
details of how military operations will be carried out to be
determined by the political give-and-take between the President
and the Congress. I submit that determining the parameters of
this give-and-take is what courts do worst and what the political
process does best.
III
Throughout American history, the give-and-take between
Congress and the President has generally worked fairly well.
When the President and Congress have differed on whether to
use military force, it has usually been Congress that has been
the more reluctant. On numerous occasions in which a President
has sought prior congressional approval for a military action,
Congress has declined to give its approval, and the proposed
action was abandoned. Notably, President Buchannan made eight
unsuccessful requests to Congress for authority to use force in
Latin America before abandoning his efforts. 3
The reason the war powers question is contentious at all,
however, is that on other occasions the "give-and-take" has
"W REvELEY, WAR PowERs OF Ta PRESMENT AND CONGRESS 82-83 (1981).
22 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
11 W REvELEY, supra note 11, at 121-22.
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turned almost exclusively into "take" by the President with very
little "give." For example, in 1900, President McKinley sent
5,000 troops and naval forces into China to suppress the Boxer
Rebellion. Although the campaign involved military intervention
in the domestic politics of another state and numerous casualties,
President McKinley maintained throughout that it did not re-
quire a congressional declaration of war. 14 In 1926, Calvin Cool-
idge sent 5,000 troops to suppress a guerilla war against a pro-
American regime m Nicaragua and made the same claim.' 5
Of course, the military incursion that most forcefully raised
the question of when the President exceeds his war power was
the Vietnam War. Now is not the time to go into the details of
that dispute, but it is worth noting that the battles of that era
led Congress to attempt something it had never tried before: a
statutory delineation of procedures to be used by the President
and by Congress in deciding when to engage in hostilities.
The War Powers Resolution gets far better press than it
deserves. It was weakly written by Congress and has been even
more weakly enforced. One of the War Powers Resolution's
strongest proponents, Senator Jacob Javits, described it as "a
methodology by which the collective judgment of Congress and
the President could be rendered on the question whether to risk
or initiate conflict.' 6 I am afraid that that description somewhat
overstates the case. In reality, the Resolution is an abject ex-
ample of a statute that is full of sound and fury and signifies
very little. When it was being drafted, those Senators who fought
to have the Resolution clearly spell out the limits of the Presi-
dent's war powers were defeated. The Resolution begins by
conceding extremely broad war powers to the President: until its
sixty-day limitation kicks in, the discretion left to the President
to dispatch troops is considerable. The consultation and infor-
mational sections are equally feckless. Consultation in advance
of commencing hostilities is not made a blanket rule; the statute
gives the President a sizeable loophole in requiring consultation
only "in every possible instance." The written report require-
,4 Id. at 146.
" Id. at 147.
'6 Javits & Wheeler, Book Review, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rav 848, 853 (1982).
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ment is such that Presidents can easily fulfill their obligations
under it while providing Congress with little useful information
about the hostilities. 7
That the Resolution is weakly enforced was vividly demon-
strated only this autumn. It is notable that, with all of the
hostilities that have occurred in the Persian Gulf in the past four
months, Congress has still steadfastly declined to invoke its
provisions.
IV
The disputes over the Vietnam War left a second important
legacy in the war powers area: the lawsuit, often filed with at
least one Congressman as a plaintiff, asking the courts to inter-
vene in limiting a President's use of the war power. More than
twenty such suits were filed during the Vietnam War. With the
exception of one district court, quickly reversed on appeal, every
court faced with the question of the war's legality declined to
decide it. Some of the courts held that Congress had authorized
the war, either by voting for military appropriations or by en-
actments like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and extensions of the
draft. The vast majority of the courts that heard these cases
found that various jurisprudential doctrines precluded them from
reaching the merits. Most frequently, they held that the issue
presented was a nonjusticiable political question. Less often,
they held that the plaintiffs before them lacked standing to bring
the claim. "'
The theory behind the political question doctrine, that some
political disputes are not justiciable, has a long and honorable
tradition. As early as 1801, the Supreme Court held in United
States v The Schooner Peggy'9 that it would not involve itself
in a case over whether the United States had violated a treaty
with France when it seized a particular schooner on the high
seas off the coast of Haiti. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the
Court that "if the nation has given up the vested rights of its
11 See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1982)).
" See W REvELEY, supra note II, at 212-17.
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 102 (1801).
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citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to
consider whether it be a case proper for compensation." 20 Since
that time, courts have applied the doctrine in a wide variety of
areas, from the Supreme Court's holding in 1849 in Luther v.
Borden21 that whether a state has a republican government as
promised by article IV, section 4 is. a political question, to my
own court's holding a few years ago in Vander Jagt v O'Neill22
that a variation of the doctrine precludes review of the House
Democratic leadership's method of making committee assign-
ments.
Over the years, the political question doctrine has had par-
ticular resiliency in cases involving foreign policy In the early
years of this century, the Supreme Court declared of foreign
policy that "what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 23 The Court
has since rejected this absolutist approach. In Baker v Carr,2
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explicitly disclaimed
previous "sweeping statements to the effect that all questions
touching foreign relations are political questions." z Neverthe-
less, as the Supreme Court itself demonstrated eleven years after
Baker, in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim in Gilligan v Morgan,26
a Vietnam-era challenge to the traimng of the Ohio National
Guard, the doctrine retains particular force in the military con-
text.
The question of standing is in many ways closely related to
the political question doctrine. The theory behind standing is
slightly different: it is not that the issues in the case are not the
sort judges should decide, but rather that the party bringing the
suit does not have sufficient personal interest in the suit to bring
it. In its narrow sense, standing is simply a jurisprudential device
to ensure that a court settles only real cases and controversies
with parties on both sides who have a genuine stake in the
20 Id. at 110.
21 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
- 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
23 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
-, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 Id. at 211.
- 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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outcome of the dispute. Standing begins to resemble the political
question doctrine, however, when taken to an extreme-that is,
in those cases in which courts have stated or strongly implied
that there may be some alleged wrongs that no one has standing
to challenge.
In 1974, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War,27 the Supreme Court held that a group of citizens lacked
standing to challenge a Congressman's membership in the Armed
Forces Reserve as a violation of the article I, section 6 mcom-
patibility clause. In so holding, the Court stated that the "gen-
eralized interest" of all citizens in constitutional governance is
"too abstract" to create a concrete injury 2 Almost forty years
before, the Court had applied similar principles in Ex parte
LevittP to find that an individual citizen lacked standing to
challenge, on ineligibility clause grounds, Justice Black's ascen-
sion to the Supreme Court bench. In an analysis that is highly
germane to the war powers context, the Schlesinger Court stated
that such "citizen standing," if recognized, would have no log-
ical limits, and would "distort the role of the Judiciary in its
relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the
Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by
injunction.' ",30 Instead, the Court stated that the absence of a
litigant with standing to challenge a particular action gives sup-
port to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress and ultimately to the political process.
In light of the problems with citizen standing, members of
Congress have occasionally resorted to another tack: asserting
special congressional standing to challenge unconstitutional ac-
tions. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congressmen may
in some cases have special standing to challenge an unconstitu-
tional action. In one case, Coleman v Miller,31 the Supreme
Court held that a group of Kansas legislators had standing to
challenge the right of the state's lieutenant governor to break tie
votes in the state senate. The Coleman case turned, however, on
- 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
29 Id. at 227.
- 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
- Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222.
31 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the legislators' particular interest in "mamtaiing the effective-
ness of their votes." 32 In another case, Kennedy v. Sampson,
33
my own court used the same principle to hold that Senator
Edward Kennedy had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the procedure by which President Nixon pocket-vetoed a bill
for which Kennedy had voted. Congressional standing has never
been extended beyond this narrow area of cases in which legis-
lators are suing to maintain the effectiveness of their individual
votes.
The limits of the congressional standing are well described
in a case to which I am particularly partial: McClure v Carter,
34
the decision which allowed me to remain on the bench. In
McClure, a special three-judge district court held that a Senator
who was challenging my appointment to the bench based on the
emoluments clause did not have standing. Judge Betty Fletcher,
writing for the court, noted that the Senate had every opportu-
mty to consider the emoluments clause issue when it voted to
confirm me and that it still voted to confirm. The court then
distinguished Coleman, stating: "[tihat [Senator McClure] and
like-minded senators did not prevail in the Senate does not mean
that the effectiveness of [his] vote was impaired within the
meaning of Coleman v Miller It means merely that he was on
the losing side." ' 35
Actually, the congressional standing issue in McClure had
an additional twist because of a special jurisdictional statute
under which Senator McClure sued. I do not think I am being
paranoid when I say that this statute is probably as close as
Congress has ever come to enacting a bill of attainder. The
statute, which was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill in
1979, gave members of Congress standing in a particularly nar-
row set of cases: challenges under the emoluments clause to the
appointment of judges elevated to the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals during the 96th Congress.3 6 Needless
37 Id. at 438.
3 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
513 F Supp. 265 (D. Idaho) (special three-judge district court), aff'd, McClure
v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
35 Id. at 270.
31 Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656, 657-58 (1979) (not codified).
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to say, the law has never been used to challenge the appointment
of anyone but me. Nevertheless, despite the statute, the McClure
court found that Senator McClure did not have standing. Judge
Fletcher noted that jurisprudential doctrines like standing have
an important role in fixing the lines between the branches of the
government, and cannot be abandoned simply because Congress
passes a statute. The court stated that even with such a law in
place, courts will not take on powers and responsibilities that
rightfully belong to the other two branches.
Taken together, the political question doctrine and the stand-
ing requirement provide two bases for courts to decline judicial
review in the war powers context. I will not discuss the details
of when a court should utilize which doctrine. Although either
doctrine may be grounds for a court to decline to review a war
powers case, clearly each entails a different doctrinal inquiry
before a court can reach that conclusion. The Supreme Court
gave useful guidance in Schlesinger, however, when it noted that
"It]he more sensitive and complex task of determimng whether
a particular issue presents a political question causes courts
to turn initially, although not invariably, to the question of
standing to sue." '37
V
Clearly if a court wishes to avoid deciding a war powers
question, it has the doctrinal tools to do so. The difficult ques-
tion is when the courts should resort to using them. I believe
that courts should in general be reluctant to step into the war
powers area. Justice Frankfurter issued a much-needed reminder
when he wrote in the steel seizure case that "[t]he Framers
did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government. 3 8
The President, Congressmen, and judges have all taken the same
oath to uphold the Constitution; no reason exists for judges to
step in and decide disputes between the other two branches when
political avenues exist for those branches to settle the matters
themselves. The Founders skillfully allocated powers between the
37 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 215.




President and Congress so that, when disputes arise, each branch
has powerful weapons with which to induce the other to coop-
erate. I believe that courts should step in only when that political
process breaks down.
The key question then becomes when the political process
may be said to have broken down. I do not subscribe to the
view propounded by my colleague Judge Bork that courts need
never involve themselves in disagreements between the Congress
and the President simply because Congress has the power to
impeach. The threat of impeachment is clearly too blunt a weapon
to rely on to settle any disputes but the most extreme ones.
Rather, I believe that Justice Powell enunciated a wise test in
his discussion of ripeness in his concurrence in Goldwater v
Carter,39 a suit by a number of Congressmen claiming that
President Carter's termination of our treaty with Taiwan "de-
prived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change
in the supreme law of the land." 40 Justice Powell noted that
"[d]ifferences between the President and the Congress are com-
monplace in our system" and that these disputes usually "turn
on political rather than legal considerations." He stated that the
test of whether a court hears such a case should be whether each
branch has asserted its constitutional authonty-or, as he put
it, whether the political branches have reached a "constitutional
impasse.' '41
Justice Powell's "constitutional impasse" test harkens back
to a seminal set of distinctions made by Justice Jackson in his
concurring opinion in the steel seizure case. Justice Jackson
stated that disputes between the President and Congress that
come before the courts can be divided into three broad catego-
ries. The President's authority is at its greatest, Jackson wrote,
when he is acting pursuant to an express or implied authorization
from Congress. 42 By contrast, his power is at its lowest ebb when
he takes measures that are incompatible with Congress's express
or implied will.43 Finally, there are those actions taken in what
31 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
- Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurrng).
4 Id. at 997
41 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurrng).
41 Id. at 637-38.
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Justice Jackson called "the zone of twilight"-when the presi-
dent acts, in the absence of either a Congressional grant or
denial of authority in those areas in which Congress and the
President have concurrent power or in which the distribution is
uncertain. Justice Jackson advised that, when a President acts
in this "zone of twilight," it is important for a court to scrutinize
Congress's posture. He noted that "congressional inertia, indif-
ference or quiescence may sometimes . enable, if not invite,
independent presidential responsibility "44
Taken together, the approaches of Justice Powell and Justice
Jackson counsel a careful scrutiny of the words and the deeds
of Congress when reviewing a President's actions in this "zone
of twilight." They instruct courts to examine closely whether
Congress has unsuccessfully attempted to assert its constitutional
authority to stop the President's actions. Applied to the Presi-
dent's war powers, this constitutional impasse approach would
carve out a carefully circumscribed but nevertheless very real
role for judicial review of presidential war powers.
Lawsuits that ask courts to halt ongoing hostilities will have
trouble meeting this test. Because war is expensive, it is extremely
difficult for a President to engage in real hostilities when Con-
gress is resolved to stop him. At the point at which a constitu-
tional impasse occurs, Congress can simply cut off funding for
any military use of which it does not approve. This was the
problem with the well-meaning attempts to get the courts to
declare the Vietnam War to be illegal. No constitutional impasse
existed; the President was acting, and although Congress had
never declared war outright, it clearly lacked either the will or
the courage to use its considerable powers to halt the hostilities.
Toward the end of the war, Senator Gaylord Nelson-a cospon-
sor of the War Powers Resolution-lamented the highly defer-
ential attitude Congress had taken to the military actions
throughout most of the war. He recalled in 1969,
In the six years that I have been in the Senate, no military
budget has been subjected by the Congress-or by the public
either-to really critical evaluation. We have passed seventy-
billion-dollar military budgets after ten minutes or an hour of
" Id. at 637
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discussion on the theory that the military knew best and
that we were dealing with purely technical military matters and
not political ones. This has been our great mistake. 45
Yet the courts cannot be expected to make Congress scrutinize
its votes more than it does or, worse still, to act under the
assumption that Congress does not fully consider the conse-
quences of its actions. As Congress continued to pass military
appropriations throughout the Vietnam War, a court could only
conclude that it was not willing to press the President to halt
hostilities. Ultimately, of course, Congress did cut off funding
for the war. In the spring of 1975, President Ford went to
Congress with a strongly-worded request for further aid, and
one fateful evemng, Congress simply said no, abruptly ending
its financing of the Vietnam War
The courts have a potentially larger role in the lawsuits that
have emerged over the President's failure to abide by the War
Powers Resolution's requirement of notice and consultation with
Congress. Requests for information are more likely to end up
in a constitutional impasse than requests for withdrawal of troops
or supplies. The funds cut-off that may be effective in troop
deployment cases is a much harder weapon for Congress to use
in notice cases: when hostilities appear to be imminent, Congress
is unlikely to tie a President's hands in advance and perhaps
compromise national security simply to make the point that it
wants to be consulted. With Congress's options thus limited, a
constitutional impasse is more likely, and the case for judicial
intervention is stronger, than in disputes over troop deployment.
Certainly, difficulties exist with the judiciary acting even in such
cases. For example, as a practical matter, it is questionable
whether the slow pace of litigation is best suited to resolving
pressing questions over the extent of the President's day-to-day
sharing of information with Congress. Like impeachment, full-
scale litigation may prove to be too blunt a weapon for taking
on the problem of presidential consultation with Congress.
Lawsuits over the President's failure to consult with Congress
will also raise the difficult question of who has standing to bring
the suit. It seems unlikely that m such a case any one member
41 Am RIcN Mmrr sM 1970 19-20 (E. Knoll & J. McFadden eds. 1969).
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of Congress would be able to show that his individual vote had
been diminished in the particular, procedural way required by
Coleman v Miller 4 Yet without such an individualized claim,
the notion of a single member of Congress pressing a conflict
between article I and article II in federal court remains unset-
tling. Perhaps, in cases of true constitutional impasse, we should
think about expanding our ideas about who is the proper party
to bring such a suit. Just as in some European countries me-
chamsms exist for the legislature as a body to bring suit, we
may want to consider the idea of creating some kind of standing
for Congress itself. In the constitutional impasse context, this
could perhaps entail giving standing to the congressional lead-
ership to represent the interests of the body as a whole in the
impasse. These and other issues of war power litigation remain
to be refined by the courts.
VI
Plutarch wrote two millenna ago that "the law speaks too
softly to be heard amid the din of arms." 47 If that was once
true, it is a tribute to our country and our Constitution that it
is not true today The problem with the judiciary controlling the
war power in America now is not that it speaks too softly but
rather that it may not always have something to say It is not
immediately clear what legal doctrine would tell a court how to
evaluate actions like that of President Roosevelt in early 1941-
how to state precisely how far Roosevelt could go, but no
farther, in the absence of explicit congressional approval. Nev-
ertheless, the time may come when a true constitutional impasse
occurs. The courts may be asked not to enter a "zone of twi-
light," in which Congress has remained silent, but to enter a
real dispute in which the President and Congress disagree about
the war power, and each has acted to the limit of its authority
If and when such a true constitutional impasse occurs between
the political branches on the war powers question, the courts
will have their strongest claim for entering into the dispute. The
- 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
41 PLUTARCH, Lives, "Caus Marius."
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law does not speak too softly today to be heard amid the din
of arms-the law is just saving its voice.
There can be no doubt that as the courts debate whether to
enter into the disputes between the executive branch and Con-
gress, the losers in such disputes will complain bitterly of the
role of the courts. If a real impasse exists that threatens the
continuity of an orderly and a lawful government, it is less
dangerous for the courts to act than to let the dispute be resolved
by the choosing up of sides by the Air Force or the Army. But
when no such impasse exists, and when the two political branches
have not exhausted their own powers to settle the matter, the
courts are well advised to take a page from Congress-and do
nothing.
